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The Liberation Movements of Southern Africa

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THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the character and prospects of the movements, commonly called liberation movements, that seek to end white minority rule in Southern Africa, their relations with other African states and with Communist countries, and the implications for the US.

CONCLUSIONS

- A. The liberation movements which are attempting to depose the white regimes of Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and South-West Africa stand little chance of significant progress through 1970, and probably for some considerable time thereafter. Most of the liberation groups will probably continue to suffer the disabilities, especially the lack of broad indigenous support, that so far have limited their efforts. But even with greater success in recruitment, none of the liberation groups is likely to expand its insurgency operations sufficiently to shake the determination of the white regimes to resist all challenges to their domination of affairs.
- B. The liberation cause has broad support among African states, and many of these believe that the US and the other great powers should take action that would terminate white rule in Southern Africa. The continued frustration of the liberation movements, therefore, will complicate US relations with African states and also US efforts to garner African support at the UN. But US relations with the African states are influenced by a number of factors and the impact of its positions with respect to Southern Africa will vary. The liberation issue alone will have the greatest impact on US relations with Tanzania and Zambia, states that border on the white dominated areas, are engaged in operational support of liberation forces, and fear retaliation by the white regimes.





C. The USSR, Communist China, and Cuba seek to expand their influence in Africa by providing limited, yet much-appreciated, military and financial assistance to the liberation groups. If the capacity of these groups to use aid effectively were to grow, the Communist states would probably provide increased assistance, but it is highly unlikely that the USSR or China would engage in direct military intervention.





DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. Despite the remarkable proliferation of independent black African states over the past decade, most of Southern Africa still is ruled by white minority regimes. Angola and Mozambique, Overseas Provinces of Portugual, are ruled directly from Lisbon in all important matters. Angola has a population of over five million, with some 250,000 Europeans; Mozambique, over seven million, with only 150,000 Europeans. Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony which declared its independence of the UK in 1965, has a white community of 240,000 in a population of about 4.5 million. Some 3.5 million whites dominate affairs in the Republic of South Africa, though the population also includes 13 million blacks and over two million Asians and racially mixed peoples. South-West Africa (SWA), ruled by South Africa since its was mandated by the League of Nations in 1920, contains less than 100,000 whites and more than 500,000 blacks.
- 2. In each of the white-controlled areas, political activity by nonwhites is severely restricted. As a result, organized groups of blacks and other nonwhites are seeking through use of force to depose the white regimes and "liberate" their homelands. So far, however, these liberation movements have been relatively ineffective. Liberation groups in Angola and Mozambique have sustained active insurgencies since 1961 and 1964, respectively, but these have been contained by Portuguese military forces largely within unimportant border areas. The would-be liberators of Rhodesia and SWA have managed no more than sporadic and ineffective terrorism within their homelands. In recent years South Africa's liberation groups, unsuccessful in occasional attempts to infiltrate terrorist bands into the Republic, have conducted only trifling clandestine political activities.
- 3. Thus, we are concerned in this estimate mainly with the implications for the US of the frustration of Southern Africa's liberation movements. Despite the limited capabilities of presently active groups, the liberation cause is an important political issue with most of the black and Arab states of Africa. Indeed, it is the one issue on which African states can generally agree and, therefore, is usually the central theme at meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OUA). The governments and political groups most vociferous in their support of the cause are critical of the reluctance of the US to commit its influence and power to rid their continent of white rulers. At the same time the white governments in Southern Africa are critical of the generalized political support the US lends to the liberation cause, whose leaders they condemn as criminals and Communists. Communist countries seek to take advantage of US embarrassment on this issue and to expand their influence in Africa by providing limited, yet much-appreciated, military and financial assistance to the liberation groups.





II. THE WHITE REGIMES

A. General

4. The white regimes of Southern Africa are determined to retain their domination of affairs and to resist, to destroy if possible, the liberation forces. Individually, they bring impressive resources to these tasks: their superior security forces and their ability—through intimidation, selective rewards, and manipulation of tribal rivalries-to undermine the appeal of the liberation movements. Some important differences in interests and policies stand in the way of close relations among the white regimes.—The Portuguese and, to some extent, the Rhodesians, are wary of the superior power of the South Africans in the area. The South Africans and the Portuguese are critical of each other's racial practices and cautious about identifying themselves too closely or openly with the still "illegal" Rhodesian regime. Yet, as the threat from the liberation movements has persisted and as insurgent groups from more than one country have occasionally acted in concert, the white regimes have stepped up their cooperation in intelligence matters and border patrols. Recently the South Africans indicated that they would send military forces, if asked, to help defend their white neighbors against black revolutionaries.1

B. Angola and Mozambique

5. Angola and Mozambique have been Portuguese possessions for over 450 years; Lisbon considers them an integral part of Portugal and is determined not to lose them. Powerful political interests in the metropole profit considerably from the Overseas Provinces, but the predominant motivations of the Salazar regime probably are political, religious, and psychological. Prime Minister Salazar and his staunch supporters in the military establishment, the oligarchy, and the Church apparently believe that retention of the African empire is essential for the preservation of Portuguese nationhood. Without it, they argue, the small and otherwise insignificant Iberian state would lose its sense of national purpose. They often express this purpose as a Missão Civilizadora—an obligation to promote in Africa a Christian, anti-Communist, multiracial society.

6. The bulk of the Portuguese population is inaudible on Salazar's African policy, as on most political matters; yet the morale of the soldiers called upon to fight for the preservation of the African empire is generally good. In the past, there have been stirrings of separatism among the European communities of Angola and Mozambique, but these have been largely stilled by the advent of black rebellion and the consequent dependence on Portugal for military protection. Besides, ubiquitous police controls repress antimetropole as well as anti-Salazar activities among whites and nonwhites alike.

The South African Government reacted to the August 1967 incursions across the Zambia-Rhodesia border of combined groups of South African and Rhodesian guerrillas, nearly all of whom were quickly killed or captured. South Africa dispatched to Rhodesia several police helicopters and a force of about 150 men to help patrol the border.





- 7. Until the outbreak of the rebellion in Angola in 1961, Portugal had largely neglected the development of Angola and Mozambique. Since then it has paid considerably greater attention to the economic interests and general welfare of the population, both white and black. Portuguese law admits no discrimination on the basis of race; traditionally, Portuguese attitudes toward nonwhites have been remarkably tolerant by the standards of the neighboring white-ruled countries. Educated blacks and mulattoes who support the political system can hold prominent governmental positions and rise high socially. Yet the vast majority of blacks in Portuguese Africa have little opportunity to obtain education or to achieve economic and social advancement.
- 8. The Portuguese have had little difficulty with overt resistance to their rule in the urban areas of Angola and Mozambique. In both Provinces the great bulk of the black population lives in scattered villages. Here, liberation groups have some success in recruiting from among several tribes in border areas. Most rural blacks, however, remain loyal to their generally pro-Portuguese village and tribal chiefs. Many tribes in the immediate insurgency areas are long-time enemies of the tribes supporting the liberation groups and for that reason alone have resisted the overtures of liberation leaders. Others are deterred by respect for the white man's superior "magic" and firepower. Intimidation and exploitation of tribal rivalries, along with stepped up local improvements and training for self defense, are the essential ingredients of a fortified village program, which has helped the Portuguese to contain the insurgent forces in Mozambique and is now being introduced in some border areas of Angola.
- 9. The manpower and financial costs to Portugal of defending the Overseas Provinces are considerable, yet clearly tolerable.—At present Portugal maintains armed forces of about 55,000 men in Angola and 40,000 in Mozambique. About one-third of the troops are local blacks and mulattoes, whose service record has been good. Portuguese military casualties probably have numbered less than a thousand per year for the past 3 years, including some 200 per year killed. Defense expenditures, mainly for Angola and Mozambique, run to over 40 percent of the Portuguese budget, roughly seven percent of national income. Partly because of the stimulation of military expenditures, the Portuguese economy has been expanding briskly in recent years, though with increasingly evident inflationary strains.

C. South Africa and South-West Africa

10. South Africa's society is based on the unqualified supremacy of its white community in all matters. The overwhelming concern of the whites and the principal charge to their government is to protect this supremacy from any challenge by the nonwhite majority. The policy of the ruling National Party for preservation of the Republic's "way of life" is apartheid or separate development, under which a great volume of restrictions and controls, the stern and the petty, is systematically imposed on the nonwhites. The whites claim that any significant concession to the other racial communities would inevitably lead to



the disintegration of the domestic peace and prosperity that benefit all races. Thus, the great bulk of the white community supports apartheid, though some would apply it more leniently for humanitarian or practical purposes.²

11. Most nonwhites resign themselves to the government's repressive policies, though resentment of white rule and of particular governmental policies probably is widespread, at least in urban areas. In any case, there have been very few manifestations of organized resistance to white rule within the Republic in recent years. This is in good measure testimony to the population's respect for South Africa's large, well-equipped, and well-trained security forces. The 29,000-man National Police, including its effective Security Branch, is the first line of defense for internal security. It is backed up by an army of about 15,000 and various trained reserves of over 100,000. Blacks make up approximately one-half of the police force, but carry no firearms in the course of their duties.

12. SWA. SWA, in effect, is ruled as an integral part of South Africa. The South Africans regard their control of the territory as vital to the Republic's security and have resisted all efforts of black African states, through the UN, to force them to relinquish control.3 By-and-large the white community of SWA is content to let Pretoria run territorial affairs. Most of the blacks apparently also are politically apathetic or cowed. Most of their chiefs cooperate with the government, except in the case of the Herero, who have long been restive under white rule. The South-West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) has a following of several thousand among the Ovambo, the largest tribe and constituting about half the population. It is permitted to exist as a political party, but its operations have been severely curtailed. Many of its younger members are critical of both the chiefs and the government.- A small minority of SWAPO adherents advocate the use of violence to achieve independence. During 1966-1967, small bands of SWAPO guerrillas, after receiving military training in Tanzania, infiltrated SWA, received some support from the local population, and mounted a short-lived guerrilla campaign. The South African Government has responded by strengthening its police forces in SWA, introducing tougher security laws, and arresting a large number of suspected dissidents, some 40 of whom now are being tried for terrorism.

D. Southern Rhodesia

13. The regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith declared Rhodesia's independence in November 1965 to forestall any UK attempt to undermine white domination of affairs. The attitudes of the European community on white supremacy have been less doctrinaire and the controls exercised over the blacks less harsh than in South Africa. This partly reflects an accommodation to UK pressures during the prerebellion period; thus, the small percentage of blacks who meet educa-

See SNIE 70-2-66, "Probable Developments Following the UN Ceneral Assembly Resolution to Terminate the South-West Africa Mandate," dated 1 December 1966, SECRET.



² For a more detailed discussion of racial policies in South Africa, see NIE 73-67, "South Africa," dated 4 May 1967, SECRET.

tional and property qualifications can vote, and about a quarter of the seats in Parliament are in effect allocated to the blacks. It also reflects the small size of the white population and the impracticality of rigid segregation. Nonetheless, even before the rebellion the Rhodesian regime had banned black nationalist political parties and detained their leaders. The subsequent militancy of the prohibited organizations and the regime's concern about security in urban areas have since led to tighter restrictive measures. There have been some recent moves, moreover, to imitate South African racial laws.

14. Most of Rhodesia's black population resides in rural areas, where it shows little interest in national politics and continued respect for the authority of village and tribal chiefs. The chiefs are semiofficial appointees of the government and mostly accept its policies. Indeed, the regime has been upgrading their prestige and training, partly as a reward for loyalty and partly to enable them to withstand the competition from liberation leaders for the allegiance of the village population. So far the rural blacks, whether from loyalty or fear, have mostly sided with the white regime, at least to the extent of informing security officials of the movements of guerrillas.

15. With the help of black informers, urban as well as rural, Rhodesia's security forces have proved highly effective in ferretting out dissidents and combating guerrilla infiltrators. These forces include 6,000 police, an army of 3,000, and trained reserves of 30,000. Blacks make up most of the police force and have served with distinction in occasional combat against liberation groups. So far, neither the security forces nor the white civilian population has suffered many casualties at the hands of insurgents. The cost of preserving white supremacy must of course also include the economic losses brought about by the sanctions instituted against the regime, first by the UK-and then by the UN. A sharp decline of exports has somewhat depressed the general level of economic activity. But the white community has suffered no privation and its political support for the Smith regime has, if anything, increased.

III. THE LIBERATION GROUPS

16. Because of the clandestine character of the liberation organizations it is difficult to estimate the size of their active membership, much less the extent of their indigenous support. Yet none appears to have more than several thousand active members or to enjoy broad popular support in its homeland. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) probably is the largest single organization, with some 5,000 to 7,000 active members. The three feuding Angolan groups together probably have about the same number. The Rhodesian liberation groups probably count their active members only in the hundreds, most of them outside the country. The South African groups probably also count their active members in the hundreds, including both potential insurger and scattered long-time political exiles. The Rhodesian and South African organizations are outgrowths of formerly legal political parties. They undoubtedly have many supporters within the respective countries who are rigidly suppressed



by the security apparatus and play little or no active role. (For brief descriptions of the major liberation organizations of Southern Africa, see Annex.)

within their homelands. Many of the recruits are entited abroad with promises of education or employment, only reluctantly taking up the insurgency training then thrust upon them. Others are picked up from destitute refugee communities in nearby countries. Tightened security measures make it difficult for any recruits in Rhodesia, South Africa, and SWA to leave their countries. The largest Mozambique and Angola groups have had success in recruiting from certain bellicose border tribes, now, as ever, at odds with the government. The backbone of FRELIMO's fighting force comes from the Makonde tribesmen who live on both sides of the Mozambique-Tanzania border. The Bakongo, who straddle the Angola-Congo (Kinshasa) border, make up the great bulk of the active membership of the Kinshasa-based Angolan Revolutionary Covernment in Exile (GRAE).

18. The limited appeal of the liberation groups is partly due to the personal limitations of their current leaders. Experience in political organization is at a premium: the nationalist movements are of relatively recent origin, except for South Africa's African National Congress (ANC), which dates back some 50 years. In Rhodesia and South Africa, the best-known leaders and many middle-ranking cadres are in jail or under detention. Presently active leaders tend to lack political stature among the blacks back home. Usually well-educated and cosmopolitan by local standards, they tend to be somewhat estranged from the predominantly parochial and unsophisticated blacks of Southern Africa.

19. Similarly, their political message is usually lost on the home population. They present themselves and their organizations as the future guiding force of a nation occupying the territory now ruled by the white regime. Except in the case of the relatively more sophisticated South African blacks, the native populations think mostly in terms of village and tribe. The concept of fighting and dying for a state—whether called Rhodesia or Zimbabwe—is largely foreign to them. Thus, the very neglect of education and rural development, which is a major indictment made against the white regimes by liberation groups, is a serious obstacle to the latters' efforts to mobilize popular support for their cause.

20. What is more, the national outlook claimed by liberation leaders is usually belied by the bitter factionalism among competing groups. Potential supporters are often repelled by the intractability and nastiness of the competition. It is particularly rank in Angola, where rival groups periodically engage each other in armed combat. The differences between organizations seeking to liberate the same country at times reflect age-old antagonisms between tribal groups and at times cultural antagonisms (urban mulattoes or intellectuals versus tribally-oriented blacks). But personal rivalries are usually central to the inability of the would-be liberators to stick together or at least cooperate. Each leader sees himself as the "Jomo Kenyatta" of his country and refuses to share power or accept collective discipline.



21. In sum, the often widespread negative feelings of the blacks of Southern Africa toward the white regimes are not automatically translated into positive allegiance to the liberation cause, much less to a particular liberation group. Especially to the blacks in the bush, the liberation movements are often unknown, distant, or even alien, as in cases where they are identified with hostile tribes. Popular antagonisms toward the liberation groups also arise from the violence they wreak in their areas of operation or the retaliation they evoke from government security forces. Finally, when not indifferent or hostile to the liberation groups, many blacks remain inactive simply because of their conviction that no liberation group now has a real chance for success against the power of the whites.

IV. EXTERNAL AID

A. General

22. Because of the imposing strength of the white regimes and the difficulties of the liberation movements in arousing indigenous support, they are vitally dependent upon external assistance. The financial and material aid they get from independent African states, from Communist countries, and from various Western sources sustains their political and diplomatic activities. The training and staging facilities provided by the black states that border on the white ruled areas and the arms and advanced training provided by the Communists, and to a lesser extent by North African states, are indispensable to their insurgency efforts.


B. The Role of African States

23. Nearly all the African states, black and Arab, champion the liberation cause at the UN, in such forums as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, and in bilateral relations with the US and other world powers. Nearly all give verbal support to the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC), which was formed to provide political and financial backing for the insurgency efforts of the liberation groups. The annual budget of the ALC has run to about \$2 million in recent years, assessed against 36 OAU member states roughly on the basis of population. Total payments, however, have come to only one-half of annual assessments and a number of countries have made no payments. The delinquent members claim preoccupation with domestic problems or disgust with the factionalism and slow progress of the liberation groups. Some of these countries contribute directly to individual liberation groups, thereby encouraging the divisions they lament.

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25. Tanzania currently shoulders the major burden of support. President Julius Nyerere is personally dedicated to the liberation cause; besides, his country never has had significant economic ties with the white states of Southern Africa. Dar es Salaam serves as headquarters of the ALC. FRELIMO and two competing South African groups maintain their exile headquarters there and nearly all groups have political representatives. Tanzania provides the most extensive training facilities for African insurgents, with Chinese as well as Tanzanian instructors. It also is the major entrepot for Communist arms for the liberation groups and the embarkation point for trips to Communist countries in quest of subventions or paramilitary training. Though Nyerere keeps an eye on the movement of weapons within Tanzania, he apparently has few qualms about acting as host to the black rebels and their Chinese tutors. He is much more concerned with the threat of Portuguese retaliation against the staging bases of FRELIMO in southern Tanzania. So far the Portuguese have been remarkably tolerant of Tanzania's activities in behalf of hostile military forces.

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27. Zambia, which touches four of the five white-ruled areas, is potentially the most important border state for the military operations of the liberation movements. President Kenneth Kaunda is personally dedicated to the liberation cause, but Zambia's acute economic dependence on Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa has made him circumspect. He has lent support to competing movements, including the two Rhodesian groups, which have headquarters in Lusaka and the two groups operating against the eastern region of Angola. In





the past he has permitted intermittent border crossings by guerrilla groups, but prohibited paramilitary training and the use of Zambia as a sanctuary for staging hit-and-run raids. He did, however, permit the recent infiltrations into Rhodesia by Rhodesian and South African guerrillas. This may indicate a willingness to take greater risks on behalf of liberation efforts; it already has evoked threats of economic and military retaliation from Rhodesia and South Africa.

28. Aside from the border countries, several other African states from time to time have given direct support to the insurgency efforts of the liberation forces. Ghana prior to the downfall of Nkrumah and Algeria before the overthrow of Ben Bella were important centers for guerrilla training and supplies of weapons. Early in 1967 Algeria showed an interest in resuming a major role in the liberation cause; but so far there has been little evidence of an increase in activities. Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco also provide arms and training assistance, though on a minor scale. Guinea, which now devotes its attention to the insurgency campaign against Portuguese Guinea, at one time succored Angolan liberationists.

C. Communist Support

29. The USSR, China, and Cuba are the major sources of military equipment for the liberation movements. All three countries provide paramilitary training in their home countries, and the latter two also dispatch instructors, China for the training facilities in Tanzania and Cuba for those in Congo (Brazzaville). The East European Communist States contribute weapons and sponsor training, mainly as an adjunct of Soviet assistance programs. Communist countries also are an important source of financial assistance to the liberation cause and for miscellaneous help, such as medical services and academic scholarships. Finally, the Communist countries champion the liberation cause in international forums, though the Soviets in particular have avoided commitments that would involve them in direct military action.

30. For the Communist countries, assistance to the liberation movements represents a low-cost, low-risk investment intended to undermine the Western position in Africa and to bolster their own prospects for immediate and long-term influence.—They are unencumbered by political or economic ties with the white-ruled states, so they suffer no losses by antagonizing them. Actual expenditures on behalf of the liberation movements are small. Yet, inexpensive as they are, the aid programs gain the Communists a degree of acceptance among liberation leaders and among African nationalists generally that tends to offset African criticism of heavyhanded Communist political ventures elsewhere on the

Data on the amounts of Communist aid are sketchy. Military supplies are mostly surplus stores of small arms, ammunition, and field equipment. These are often distributed indirectly through the governments of Tanzania and Congo (Brazzaville). Financial help from all Communist sources probably does not exceed \$500,000 per year. The number of Southern Africans received by the Communist countries for paramilitary training probably ranges from 200 to 300 per year.

continent (e.g., in Ghana under Nkrumah).—Some Africans charge, however, that Communist assistance, particularly the competition for influence between the USSR and China, exacerbates factionalist tendencies among the liberation groups.

31. USSR. The Soviet practice generally has been to cultivate ties with the liberation group they regard as most promising from each white-ruled country, to back it exclusively, and to be fairly generous with offerings of military equipment. Soviet-backed groups include FRELIMO, MPLA, ANC, SWAPO, and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) of Rhodesia. The MPLA consistently espouses a pro-Communist line, while the ANC has close ties with the outlawed South African Communist Party and FRELIMO has Communists among its second-level leaders. Except for the MPLA, however, the groups have not manifested a strong affinity for Communist ideas. They desperately need military and financial assistance and the USSR has proved to be a reliable source.

32. China. The Chinese appear to follow a scatter-gun approach in extending aid. They mostly avoid continuing obligations to a single group, apparently preferring to review the results of each individual infusion on the military and political activities of the recipient. At times they have assisted Soviet-backed groups; at times, their rivals; at times, both simultaneously. They apparently hope that strenuous indoctrination of trainees in China will influence various groups to adopt a pro-Chinese line, at once anti-Western and anti-Soviet. They apparently attach a high priority to the funding and manning of training facilities in Tanzania, which principally benefit FRELIMO. Here, they seem not to have overemphasized indoctrination, but seek to win the respect of Tanzanians and trainees through their professional competence.

33. Cuba. The Castro regime at present gives major aid to only one liberation group in Southern Africa: the Soviet-backed MPLA. Perhaps in an attempt to prove that Cuba is a worldwide leader of anti-imperialist revolutions, Castro's aid has been particularly bold. Cubans probably have participated in guerrilla forays and Castro once offered 1,200 Cuban volunteers to any African revolutionary group. There were no takers.

D. Role of the West

34. With the exception of the MPLA, the liberation groups seek material and political assistance from Western sources, in part to avoid too close an identification with Communist patrons. Most African states urge the Western governments to support the liberation movements. To the disappointment of the Africans, material assistance from the West has been much less significant than Communist aid. Public and private sources in the US, the UK, and other Western countries have provided funds, scholarships, and medical and welfare aid for political exiles and refugees from white-ruled countries. But Western sources have extended almost no military assistance.

35. Liberation groups and their African champions are also disgruntled over the ineffectiveness of Western political and diplomatic action on behalf of



their cause. They welcome US and other Western condemnations of minority rule and racial discrimination in Southern Africa, but they almost certainly believe that these actions fall far short of what the West could do. UK pressures against the Smith regime in Rhodesia are considered inadequate and insincere; and the US and the UK are rebuked as apostles of restraint at the UN in such matters as bringing South Africa to heel on control of SWA. Both are also denounced, often bitterly, for permitting indirect support of the South African regime through private investments and trade. Finally, the US in particular and NATO nations in general are indicted for their military aid to Portugal, which, the Africans claim, helps the Portuguese to sustain their control of Angola and Mozambique.

V. PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

36. We believe that the liberation movements stand little chance of significant progress toward deposing any of the white regimes of Southern Africa through 1970, and probably for some considerable time thereafter. The key to the matter, in our view, is the will and ability of the white regimes to pay the military and economic costs necessary to resist the insurgency efforts of the nonwhites. Most of the liberation movements will probably continue to suffer for some time the disabilities that so far have limited their efforts, particularly the inability to attract broad indigenous support. But even with greater success in recruitment, and the higher level of external support which would probably follow from that, no liberation group is likely to expand its operations sufficiently to raise the costs of white resistance to an intolerable level.

37. Portuguese Africa. For at least the next several years, nothing short of a civil war or social revolution in Portugal would be likely to undermine the determination of Salazar (age 78) or any likely successor to retain possession of Angola and Mozambique. The success so far in containing the insurgencies, the improving economic prospects of the two Provinces, and the dire internal troubles of such independent black states as Congo (Kinshasa) and Nigeria appear to be reinforcing Portuguese convictions that their course in Africa is the best one for whites and nonwhites alike.

38. Rhodesia. We see no early prospect of liberation groups being able to sustain insurgency operations within Rhodesia. Even if they were to, we believe the Rhodesian security forces would contain the guerrillas in sparsely populated border areas, much the way the Portuguese have done with FRELIMO. In a future political settlement with the UK, the Rhodesian whites might pledge a gradual increase in the political role of blacks. Such an arrangement would probably not satisfy liberation leaders. In the absence of a settlement with the UK, however, the whites will probably complete their break by declaring Rhodesia a Republic some time during the next year or two. Such a course would probably be accompanied by more stringent restrictions against the black population and might produce outbreaks of disorder in urban areas. The liberation forces would probably be unable to exploit these and security forces would almost certainly maintain control.





39. South Africa and SWA.

The Republic might also witness from time to time incidents of racial violence; but liberation groups would probably not be in a position to prolong them and security forces would probably restore order swiftly. The South African regime has announced plans to create Bantustans or homelands in SWA for the Ovambos and other tribes, with some degree of internal self-rule. This is partly intended to bolster the prestige of the conservative chiefs and diminish the political appeal of SWAPO. Opposition to white rule, however, will probably continue, and the South Africans if necessary will employ stiffer security measures.

- 40. We expect still closer cooperation in security matters among the white regimes over the next several years. The South African Government, in the wake of its reaction to the ANC incursions into Rhodesia, will probably be responsive, at least for some time, to Rhodesian or Portuguese requests for security assistance, whether or not South African rebels are immediately involved. Moreover, regularization, one way or another, of the status of the Rhodesian regime would probably produce closer political and economic ties between Salisbury and Pretoria, while planned South African participation in development projects in Angola and Mozambique will draw the Portuguese and South Africans somewhat closer.
- 41. The liberation movements, despite these dismal prospects, will almost certainly persist in their efforts, and some of them will probably achieve significant increases in membership over time. Next to the question of recruitment, the actual level of insurgency operations will probably depend most heavily on the extent of support by the border states. We see very little prospect of sustained operational assistance from Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi. Even if a radical regime were to replace one of the present cautious ones and were to initiate such help, pressures from the white states would force it to change its course or would soon undermine its tenure. Tanzania and Congo (Brazzaville) will almost certainly remain steadfast in their operational backing of FRELIMO and MPLA. The course of Congo (Kinshasa) is likely to fluctuate with the strength and inclination of the regime in power and the degree of pressure exerted by the Portuguese. Whatever pressures the Portuguese may exert, however, Kinshasa will probably be unable to exercise consistent control over Angolan rebels operating from its territory.
- 42. Zambia is likely to temper activism with prudence. Kaunda and his associates, frustrated at Rhodesia's continued survival and at their own vulnerability to pressure from the white regimes, are likely intermittently to give freer rein to Zambia-based insurgents. But because Zambia's acute economic dependence on Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa will continue for some years, the Kaunda government will probably retrench its support to the insurgents whenever economic retaliation appears imminent.





43. The liberation cause will continue to be an issue with broad appeal in Africa. The OAU summit meeting in Kinshasa in September 1967, impressed by the ANC-ZAPU incursions into Rhodesia, pledged to contribute \$2 million to the ALC for still another year. Many states, as in the past, will probably be less enthusiastic about supporting guerrilla operations by the time payments fall due, however. Diplomatic support of the cause will, in contrast, remain steadfast. Indeed, the continued failure of the insurgency efforts of the liberation groups and the almost certain unwillingness and inability of independent African states to commit their own military forces to the struggle will probably produce intensified efforts to induce the great powers to exert effective pressure on the white regimes. In all likelihood, the Africans will not be satisfied by the response.

44. The continued frustration of the liberation movements will complicate US bilateral relations with African states and embarrass our efforts to garner African support at the UN. But US relations with the African states are influenced by a number of factors and the impact of its positions with respect to Southern Africa will vary. With some countries, particularly the border states of Tanzania and Zambia, the liberation question already is central in their foreign policy and will probably grow in importance. Some other countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Ghana) put such value on their close relations with the US that they usually will tolerate our stand on the liberation question whenever it waries with their own. Meanwhile, so many formidable problems stand in the varies with their own. Meanwhile, so many formidable problems stand in the way of harmonious US relations with such radical governments as Congo (Brazzaville) and the UAR that positions taken by the US regarding Southern Africa are not likely to make much difference.

45. Though virtually all African governments repeatedly proclaim their support for the liberation struggle, a good number, including most of the former French colonies, become actively involved in the issue only when under pressure from their more committed African colleagues. These governments are preoccupied with enormous problems of national development and face no urgent domestic demand for action on liberation. Many of them look to the US as a potential if not actual source of economic aid and development capital and as an important trading partner. They would wish to continue beneficial ties even when they disagreed with particular US policies on Southern Africa. If, however, Africans generally were to come to believe that the US was indifferent to the liberation cause, the liberation issue would become much more important; it could become of primary importance in US-African relations if the Africans came to believe that the US was actually seeking to perpetuate white minority rule.

46. The Communist states will continue to exploit their opportunities in the liberation issue. The USSR and Cuba would probably grant increased assistance to any of the groups they support which demonstrates a capacity to absorb more aid. We think it highly unlikely, however, that the Soviets would answer a call for direct military intervention against a white regime, either unilaterally





or through a UN-sponsored joint venture. The Chinese probably view their growing economic assistance to Tanzania and Zambia and their support for liberation groups as related opportunities. Although the Chinese would probably be willing to increase the scope of their aid to these groups, they would be highly unlikely to engage in direct military intervention against a white regime.





ANNEX

LIBERATION GROUPS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

ANGOLA

- 1. GRAE. The Angolan Revolutionary Covernment in Exile, the largest of the Angolan movements, is an outgrowth of political groups formed in the mid-1950's and partly responsible for the start of the insurgency in 1961. GRAE is dominated by Holden Roberto and draws the great bulk of its active members from his fellow Bakongo tribesmen. Most of its external support is from moderate African states. Congo (Kinshasa) serves as political headquarters and as the training and staging base for GRAE insurgents. Guerrilla groups have been persistently active in northwest Angola since 1961. Over the past year GRAE, has also engaged in sporadic guerrilla incursions along the central and eastern sectors of the Congo-Angola border.
- 2. MPLA. The smaller Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola was organized in the mid-1950's by urban blacks and mulattoes and has taken part in the insurgency since 1961. It is led by Agostinho Neto and based in Congo (Brazzaville), where it gets training from Cuban instructors. It espouses a pro-Communist line and draws most of its financial and military assistance from the USSR. Its guerrilla activities in northwest Angola and the Cabinda enclave are insubstantial. In 1966 it began to operate from Zambia against eastern Angola with somewhat greater effect.
- 3. UNITA. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola was formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi, a defector from GRAE. It has a small core of trained guerrillas and has gained the support, through tribal affinity and intimidation, of a number of villages in eastern Angola. Zambia recently forced Savimbi to move his headquarters from Lusaka to Tanzania. This, together with a persistent shortage of weapons, will probably limit UNITA's effectiveness for some time. UNITA has received minor Chinese military and financial aid.

MOZAMBIQUE

1. FRELIMO. The Mozambique Liberation Front springs from dissident groups organized in the early 1960's and began its insurgency in 1964. It is led by Eduardo Mondlane. Most of its 5,000 to 7,000 active members are from the Makonde tribe of northern Mozambique, the area of its guerrilla operations.



FRELIMO has headquarters in Tanzania, the staging base for its guerrilla incursions. It receives most of its external financial aid from African sources. The USSR and China both provide military assistance. FRELIMO guerrilla operations have grown increasingly proficient, but the Portuguese have nonetheless contained them mostly within border areas near Tanzania.

2. COREMO. The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee split off from FRELIMO in 1964.—Zambia-based, it sporadically ventures into western Mozambique for political activity and occasionally for guerrilla raids. Led by Paulo Gumane, it has at the most 100 to 200 members and receives a sporadic flow of small-scale assistance from China.

RHODESIA

1. ZAPU. The Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, successor to earlier nationalist parties, was formed in 1961 and banned in 1962. Its best known leaders, including Joshua Nkomo, and many members are under detention. It probably has 500 or so active members, mostly in exile and led by James Chikerema. Political headquarters are in Zambia, which permits border crossings by guerrillas, but not the use of its territory as a sanctuary or staging base. Most military training takes place in Tanzania. Most of its financial support comes from African states; the bulk of its military equipment, from the USSR. Nearly all the insurgents who pass into Rhodesia are killed, captured, or desert the cause. The ZAPU organization within Rhodesia has been crippled by infiltrations and arrests by security forces.

2. ZANU. The Zimbabwe African National Union was formed in 1963, with the defection of a group of urban intellectuals from ZAPU. ZANU was banned in 1964 and its leaders, including Ndabaninge Sithole, arrested. It now is led by Herbert Chitepo and probably is smaller than ZAPU, with which it competes bitterly. It too is based in Zambia and receives the bulk of its military training in Tanzania. China has supplied small amounts of military and financial aid. Similar to ZAPU, ZANU's efforts at terrorism and political activity within Rhodesia have been ineffective.

SOUTH AFRICA

1. ANC. The African National Congress was organized in 1912 and banned in 1960. Many experienced leaders and members are under detention. Oliver Tambo now is its President. The ANC is closely associated with the banned South African Communist Party. Most of its financial aid is from the Communist Party of the UK and from the USSR; the latter probably provides the bulk of its military equipment. The ANC has headquarters in Tanzania. In





addition to several hundred political exiles scattered throughout the world, it probably has a hundred or so trained guerrillas. Occasional attempts to infiltrate South Africa have been unsuccessful. Its political organization within the Republic is weak and infiltrated by government agents.

2. PAC. The Pan-African Congress split off from the ANC in 1959, because of dissatisfaction with the latter's multiracial character and the extent of Communist influence. It was banned in 1960, with many leaders and members placed under detention. The PAC is wracked by factionalism and probably has no more than 100 or so active members, nearly all in exile. Political head-quarters are in Tanzania. China has provided limited financial and military aid.

SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

1. SWAPO. The South-West Africa Peoples Organization, formed in 1959, operates as a legal party, with perhaps several thousand active members, mostly from the Ovambo, the largest tribe. —A minority of SWAPO members, perhaps 200 or so, advocate use of violence. Led by Sam Nujoma, these have head-quarters in Tanzania and receive financial help from a variety of African sources. The USSR provides both monetary and military aid. During 1966-1967, SWAPO guerrilla bands infiltrated SWA, received some local support, and conducted a short-lived guerrilla campaign. This led to a stern crackdown by the South African Covernment, and no new incidents have been reported over the past several months.

2. SWANU. The South-West Africa National Union is one of several insubstantial liberation groups formed by dissident Herero tribesmen. It has headquarters in Tanzania but only a minuscule membership.



1.3(a) (4)